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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

.

STATE OF UTAH, by and through
Utah State Department of Social
Services,

.

Plaintiff-Respondent,

.

-vD. JOHN MUSSELMAN and
LINDA ANN COR&11,

Defendants-Appellant.

..
..
.

Case No. 18161

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE

Defendant has appealed from a denial of a motion to
set aside a judgment by default in the Third Juaicial District
Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the
Honorable G. Hal Taylor presiding.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT

The lower court denied the motion of the defendantappellant to set aside the default judgment on the grounds
that the defendant-appellant's proposed answer failed to state
a defense and thereafter entered its order accordingly.
lower court made no finding or ruling on the issue of
excusable neglect.
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The

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff-respondent seeks a judgment and order
affirming the aenial of defendant-appellant's motion to set
aside the default judgRent.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

Linda Ann Coram obtained a Medicaid grant from tbe
State of Utah,

Departmen~

of Social Services, whereby she

received the benefit of a total sum of $82,522.22 paid by the
State of Utah to her medical providers all of which payments

allegedly resulted from improper treatment by her doctor.

She

assigned to the State the right to recover as against any
liable third party these medical expenses and in 1979 the Utah
Legislature enacted the Medical Benefits Recovery Act, Section
55-lSd-l through 17 (re-enacted in 1981 as Section 26-19-1

through 17), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended.

(Complaint

and proposed answer.)
Defendant-appellant was retained in 1979 to
represent Linda Ann Coram in a malpractice action against the
doctor who allegedly caused the need for the Medicaid grant

which resulted in a pre-trial settlement of $150,000.00.
Prior to pr0ceeding with the case, defendant-appellant
contacted the State of Utah, Office of Recovery Services and

inquired as to the State's Medicaid

cla~

of $82,522.22 and

thereafter agreed to collect said sum out of any recovery,
taking for his services the

sta~u~ory

25% contingency fee.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2

When the case was settled, the insurance carrier issued two
settlement drafts; one was in the sum of $67,477.78; payable
to Linda Ann Coram, her husband and D. John Musselman
(defendant-appellant); the other was in the sum of $82,522.22
(the exact amount of the State's Medicaid claim), and was
payable to Linda Ann Coram, her husband, D. John Musselman and
the State of Utah Office of Recovery Services (emphasis
added).

Both drafts were issued on February 5, 1981.

The

draft in the sum of $82,522.22 shows endorsements as follows:
"Linda Ann Corma,

11

and "State of Utah

"William Dyerl Coram," "D. John Musselman"
Office of Recovery Services by:

Musselman its Attorney at Law and in Fact."

D.

John

(Emphasis added).

(Affidavit in Opposition of Motion to Set Aside Judgment and
Transcript of Hearing of August 18, 1981).
The draft of $82,522.22, hereinafter called
"settlement draft," was deposited by defendant-appellant in
Bank Account No. 71-31544-3 in the name of D. John Musselman
and Associates at the Central Bank and Trust Company,
Riverside Plaza Office, Provo, Utah, on or about March 10,

1981, from which account funds were taken by D. John Musselman
and loaned or otherwise used by him.

The sum of $50,000.00

was loaned out of this same bank account to Vernon Herbst of
Blackfoot, Idaho, on April 14, 1981, by means of check no.

160, drawn on said Account No. 71-31554-3, whereby said Vernon

Herbst executed a promissory note which carried interest at
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the rate of 180% per annum (15% per month) and secured the
promissory note with a deed of trust in which D. John
Musselman was the named beneficiary.

The state did not

authorize the diverting of its funds obtained from the said
settlement draft of $82,522.22.

(Affidavit in Opposition of

Motion to Set Aside Judgrnen t and Affidavit on Order to Show
Cause) .
Numerous letters were written to defendantappellant, demanding payment to the state of the money
recovered in the settlement draft and after many promises to
account were not kept, the plaintiff-respondent filed a
lawsuit, No. C-81-4425, in the District Court of the Third
Judicial District, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah.
(Affidavit in Opposition of Motion to Set Aside Judgment).
After defendant-appellant was served stnnmons and
copy of said complaint, on June 4, 1981, he promised to
account to plaintiff-respondent for said settlement draft
funds which promises he failed to keep.

On July 6, 1981,

defendant-appellant talked on the telephone to a Mr. George
Martindale, Investigator for the Off ice of Recovery Services,
and was advised by Mr. Martindale that unless he made an
L~mediate

accounting to the State of Utah for the $ettlement

draft funds or file a responsive pleading, the attorney for
the State of Utah in Case No. C-81-4425 would have to default
him.

(Affidavit in Opposition of Motion to Set Aside

Judgrnen t) •
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No communication was ever received from defendantappellant thereafter and a default certificate was entered on
the 9th day of July, 1981, and judgment by default was granted

and docketed on July 14, 1981.

(Affidavit in Opposition of

Motion to Set Aside Judgment, Default Certificate and Judgment
by Default).

On August 13, 1981, defendant-appellant filed a

motion to set aside the judgment and noticed said motion for
argument on the 18th day of August, 1981, at 2:00 o'clock p.m.
The court ruled that notice of the motion did not comply with

the rules as to time and, therefore, ruled that defendantappellant would have renotice of his motion to set aside the
judgment.

(Transcript of August 18, 1981, p. 7, lines 7

through 11) .
A hearing on a supplementary order was set for the
same day before the Honorable G. Hal Taylor ana defendantappellant was then and there sworn under oath to answer
questions concerning the disposition of the settlement funds.
He admitted under oath the fee arrangement and acknowledged

his endorsement of the settlement draft as the "Attorney in
Law

and in Fact" of the State of Utah Off ice of Recovery

Services but thereafter took the Fifth Amendment on all other
questions regarding the funds obtained from the settlement
draft.

(Transcript of Hearing on August 18, 1981).

5
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Defendant-appellant was ordered to appear on the 3rd
day of November, 1981, at 2:00 o'clock p.m. before the court
of the Third Judicial District, Salt Lake County, Utah, in
Civil Case No. C-81-4425, to then and there show cause, which
order to show cause was supported by an affidavit.

Defendant-

appellant did not file a counter-affidavit, nor did he offer
to counter any of the statements in the supporting affidavit
by sworn testimony.

(Motion, Affidavit and Order to Show

Cause) .
The motion of defendant-appellant to set aside the
default judgment was not noticed up on November 3, 1981, when
the order to show cause was heard by the Honorable G. Hal
Taylor; however, counsel for plaintiff-respondent agreed to
waive the notice requirement and the court thereafter heard
oral

agrlli~ent

both counsel.

on the motion to set aside the judgment from

Upon conclusion of the oral argument, the court

denied the motion of defendant-appellant to set aside the
default judgment on the grounds that the purported answer did
not state a defense and entered its order accordin;ly, from
which order defendant-appellant appeals.

(Transcript of

Hearing of November 3, 1981).
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
REFUSAL OF LOWER COURT TO SET ASIDE THE
DEFAULT JUDGMENT DID NOT CONSTITUTE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION IN VIEW OF DEFENDANTAPPELLANT' S FAILURE TO PROFFER ANY
MERITORIOUS DEFENSE.
I

One of the prerequisites for grounds to set aside a
judgment by default is the showing by the defendant that he
has a valid and meritorious defense to the claims of the
plaintiff.
While the defendant-appellant in the instant case
directed his argument in the lower court, for the most part,
on the "excusable neglect" provisions of Rule 60(b) (1), Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, the court in its ruling addressed
itself only to the requirement that the defendant must proffer
a meritorious defense to the plaintiff's complaint, a question
of law.

This principle of law was recently stated by this
court in the case of Downey State Bank v. Major-Blakeney
Corporation, 545 P.2d 507 {1976), wherein this court ruled in
referring to the defendant-appellant in that case:
primary difficulty he confronts is that,
as a general proposition one who seeks to
vacate a default judgment must proffer
some defense of at least ostensible merit
as would justify a trial of the issue thus
raised. As the trial court appropriately
remarked on this point: the defendant
fai~ea to proffer any meritorious defense,
or in fact any defense at all.
A
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The theory of law as pronounced by this court in the Downey
State Bank case, supra, was followed by this court in the
recent case of Bawden and Associates, et al. v. Alvin R.
Smith, et al., 624 P.2d 676 (1981).
In the instant case there is no dispute on the basic
facts as alleged in the complaint.

The plaintiff paid under a

Medicaid grant the total sum of $82,522.22 to medical
providers who had rendered medical care to Linda Ann Coram as
a direct result of allegedly being improperly treated for

allergy.

Linda Ann Coram retained D. John Musselman to

represent her in a malpractice claim for her injuries and_
prior to filing the lawsuit D. John Musselman by letter
inquired of the State's right of recovery and thereafter

recognized the State's right to recover the said sLUn of
$82,522.22 and claimed a fee of 25% of said sum as attorney's

fees.
Prior to trial, a settlement of $150,000.00 was
effected and two separate drafts were issued by the insurance
company.

The draft for $82,522.22 which carried the name of

the "State of Utah Office of Recovery Services," as one of the
payees was personally endorsed by all the named payees except
as to the State of Utah and, as to that payee,. D. John
Musselman himself endorsed that payee's name and signed it as
"its attorney in law and in fact."

He, thereafter, deposited

said draft in his trust account and failed to account to the
State of Utah for any such funds.
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In his proposed "answer" the defendant-appel~an:.
admits to all the material allegations in the complain~.

Be

admits the amount of the Medicaid assistance; he admits tte
written assignment by Linda Ann Coram to the State o: ~tat of
the right to recover the said Medicaid payments as aga2-ns-: a

third party; he admits that in 1979 the Medical Benefi~s
Recovery Act took effect, and, finally, he admits know~~g of
the right of the plaintiff-respondent to recover the s2id
Medicaid payments.
In the supplemental order hearing before Juas e G.

Hal Taylor the defendant-appellant was examined under oath and
admitted the genuineness of the $82,522.22 settlement craft
and his endorsement on the draft as the attorney for the State
of Utah Off ice of Recovery Services and in his proposed
"answer" he admits receiving the settlement, as allegec

the

i.:-:

complaint, and that he notified the Department "that he had
withheld the sum of $60,000.00 pending settlement
Department .... ," thereby admitting that he had

wi~h

~he

negotia~ed

the

settlement draft on which the state was named as a payee and
which draft he endorsed as the attorney for the State of

t:~ah.

The second defense as pleaded in the proposed
"anSWPr,"
. are se t
wh ere1n

f or th th e a d m1ss1ons
.
.
and denials to

the allegations of the complaint, certainly does not
a meritorious defense to the plaintiff's compla1· nt a S
the entire record before this Honorable Court.
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sE~

:orth

...
S _.i0\..-:1

·Dy

POINT II
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT IS ESTOPPED FROM
RAISING ANY OF HIS ALLEGED DEFENSES AS SET
FORTH IN HIS PROPOSED ANSWER TO THE
COMPLAINT.
The proposed answer of defendant-appellant sets
forth a third, fourth, fifth and sixth defense.

Each of these

defenses is asserted from the position that defendantappellant owes no fiduciary duty to plaintiff-respondent on
the facts in the record of the instant case.
Once defendant-appellant signed the settlement draft
as "attorney at law and in fact" for the State of Utah Office
of Recovery Services, he is estopped from asserting any
defense which would be inimical and repugnant to his duty to
the client {State of Utah) whom he purports to represent in
such endorsing act.

It would violate all principles of equity

to allow an attorney by an overt act, such as endorsing a
draft as the attorney for the payee, to obtain control of the
payee's funds and thereafter be heard to say that he was not
the payee's attorney, particularly after he had loaned out the
major portion of the funds to a third party in his {the
attorney's) own name, expecting to reap an unconscionable
return thereon for his own benefit.

Furthermore, the sixth

defense which is raised by defendant-appellant is available
only to the Medicaid recipient, Linda Coram, who is not a
party to this action and whom defendant-appellant does not
purport to be representing in the instant case.
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The position of defendant-appellant is incongruous.
Once he endorsed the settlement draft as the "attorney at law
and in fact" of the plaintiff-respondent he obtained control
of the funds as a fiduciary of that named payee and should,

therefore, be held to the strict rules of accounting to his
principal for the funds thus collected and held.
POINT III
THE DENIAL OF THE MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE
DEFAULT JUDGMENT WAS NOT AN ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AND SHOULD BE AFFIRMED.

The lower court in denying the motion to set aside
the default judgment did so on an issue of law.

It had before

it the uncontroverted affidavits of the plaintiff-responaent,
setting forth the right of plaintiff-respondent to the funds

and of defendant-appellant's conduct in obtaining control of
the funds as a fiduciary and his subsequent misuse of these
funds.

The court in its ruling made no mention of the issue

of excusable neglect.

However, since the brief of

defendant-appellant addresses this issue it will be discussed
briefly.
This court, many times, has stated that the trial
court has a discretion in determining whether to set aside a
default judgment and the determ1·nat1"on should
by this court for an abuse of discretion that

only be reversed
·s

artibtrary,
capricious and not based on adequate findings of fact or on
1

law.
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Pacer Sports and Cycle, Inc. v. Frank Myers,
534 P.2d 616 (1975)
Airkem Intermountain, Inc., et al. v. Parker,
513 P.2d 429 (1973)
American Savings and Loan Ass'n v. Pierce, et al.,
498 P.2d 648 (1972)
Board of Education of Granite School District v.
Cox, 384 P.2d 806 (1963}
In defendant-appellant's motion and argument to set
aside the judgment, he asserted that he was in the hospital
for a stomach disorder from June 29, 1981 to July 4, 1981, a
period of five days.

He did not support this statement with

any documentation nor did he counter the affidavit which
stated that on the ·6th day of July, 1981, he was contacted on
the telephone by George Martindale, Investigator for the
Office of Recovery Services, and told that unless he
immediately contact the attorney for the State and ask for
more time or account and settle, a default would be entered
and judgment by default taken.

Nor did he counter the

affidavit which stated that numerous times after the filing of
the law suit defendant-appellant asserted that he would
account to the State and pay the State its money recovered in
the settlement, which promises he never kept.
It appears obvious from the history of this case and

the record before this court that the defendant-appellant,
having loaned fifty thousand dollars ($50,000.00) of the
settlement funds to a farmer in Idaho at an interest rate of
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180% per annum (15% per month), was stalling for sufficient

time in order to realize a return of approximately thirty
thousand dollars ($30,000.00) for four months of accured
interest upon the repayment of the said loan, thus providing
ample funds back in the trust account to fully account to the
State on the settlement funds.
The default judgment and subsequent proceedings
before this court frustrated the scheme and brought to light
the actions and conduct of defendant-appellant, thereby
preventing the usage of the recovery funds to cover the
shortage in the trust account.

Although all of these facts

came to light subsequent to the entry of the default judgment,
they were all in the record at the time the court heard
argument on the motion and rulea that the proposed answer did
not state a valid defense to the State's right to recover as
against the defendant-appellant.
CONCLUSION
Most of the record on appeal in the instant case was
made before the lower court, Judge G. Hal Tay 1 or, presiding,
·
after the default judgment was entered by Judge Homer F.
-

Wilkinson.

The uncontroverted facts in the record on appeal

as shown by affidavits and the sworn testimony of defendantappellant fail to clearly demonstrate excusable neglect but
the record clearly shows that there is no meritorious defense
which is or can be

t a b
asser e
y defendant-appellant to justify
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a setting-asiae of the default judgment and a trial on the
issues raised by the defendant-appellant in his proffered
"answer."

The court should, on the basis of the foregoing

facts and the law, affirm the decision of the lower court and
enter judgment accordingly.

Dated this

;<__~day

of March, 198 2.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General
LEON A. HALGREN
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for PlaintiffRespondent
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